Open season on anyone forty or over.

Sieber v. Carson and Brookshire Grocery Company (Published Memo): If you are forty or over when you get hired, it's presumed that there's no age discrimination if you get fired.

Sieber got hired at age sixty seven when he granted hunting privileges to a Brookshire's manager.  Five years later, Sieber revoked the privileges on grounds that the manager and his son were bringing too many other people onto the land.  The manager vowed to get Sieber.  Six years later, after several write ups, the manager canned the seventy-eight year old Sieber.  Sieber sued, claiming retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and age discrimination.

The retaliation claim fails.  The law protects employees from certain types of on-the-job retaliation.  Disputes over hunting privileges isn't one of them. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.055 (Vernon 2006).  I suppose this means that the manager could have fired Sieber immediately without there being any unlawful retaliation.

An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires more than a typical employment dispute.  By the way, unpleasant and unfair actions are part of a typical employment dispute.  Even if Sieber was terminated over his age or the hunting privileges, that's not "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993).

The worst of it is that, since Sieber was over forty when he was hired, it's presumed that Brookshire's didn't discriminate based on age.  Ouch.  I turn forty this month.

Attorney's fees slashed!

Thomas v. Bobby D. Associates (Published Memo): $49,000 in fees for a $7,000 recovery is excessive.  The Tyler court orders a $24,000 remittitur.

This is a collections case.  Thomas agreed to buy six tracts of land in Van Zandt County.  He made the payments for a while, but couldn't keep them up.  Bobby D repossessed the tracts but still sued for the full amount on the notes, plus interest.  In total, Bobby D sought about $80,000 in damages.  The jury only awarded $7,000.  That's because the trial court didn't go for the Bobby D's double-dipping.  The trial court instructed the jury to base their award on the amount due on the notes less the current fair market value of the repossessed tracts.

In light of the award, the Tyler court couldn't stomach the big fee award.  Bobby D had asked for too much, had let the case linger on the docket for seven years, and had multiple attorneys get up to speed on the case only to hand it off to someone else.  The Tyler court makes Bobby D an offer: agree to a $24,000 reduction in the fee award, or have the fees wiped out and sent back to the trial court for a do-over.

Do I get to Austin via Hwy 31 to I-35 or 155 to US 79?

In re ADM Investor Services, Inc. (Published): Forum selection clause waived, at least according the the majority.  Mandamus relief denied.  The dissent would find no waiver, and would have granted mandamus.  This is a hot topic in Austin, so either way, there's a good chance that the Tyler court won't have the last word.

Prescott signed an agreement with Texas Trading (an agent for ADM)  for ADM to trade commodities for Prescott on the Chicago Board of Trade.  Prescott's account went 50 grand into the red.  ADM got that out of the hide of Dawson, the owner of Texas Trading. Dawson then successfully sued Prescott for that amount.

Prescott then sued Texas Trading and ADM for being lousy traders.  By virtue of the agreement that Prescott had signed, both Texas Trading and ADM could have asserted a forum selection clause that would have sent the matter to Illinois.  But instead Texas Trading just asked that venue to be transferred from one Texas county Rains to another (Hopkins).  ADM sat on its hands while Texas Trading got its venue transfer.

Generally speaking "[e]nforcement of forum selection clauses is mandatory unless the party opposing enforcement clearly shows that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching."  Of course, "unreasonable and unjust" could mean a lot of things.  It's a matter of sifting through prior cases to figure out what those terms really mean. In particular, arbitration cases, because the Texas Supreme Court has held that the standards for waiver of arbitration clauses are "analogous" to the standards for forum selection clauses.  See this earlier post on an interesting arbitration decision by the Tyler court.

The majority all but accuses ADM of teaming up with Texas Trading to force Prescott into litigating in two forums.  That's dirty dealing that waives the forum selection clause.

The dissent basically says: "Like it or not, the law on forum selection lets ADM do exactly that."  The dissent doesn't really take issue with the majority's statement of the law, just its application to these facts.  The dissent points to Supreme Court of Texas cases where parties let litigation roll along far longer than ADM did here without waiving the right to compel arbitration.

If memory serves, this is only the second Tyler case this year with a dissent. The first one is here.

It ain't easy being a judge

Academy of Skills & Knowledge v. Charter Schools USA, Inc. (Published): Multi-faceted dispute between a charter school and a management company.  The Tyler court earns its pay by working through every one of them.  Here are the basics:

Neither side can use CSUSA's wholly-owned subsidiary to advantage.  CSUSA created a subsidiary specifically for this school.  ASK's contract was with the subsidiary.  ASK tries to get to CSUSA via the "single business enterprise" theory.  No dice.  Then CSUSA takes a roll -- they want a judgment in their name for the management fees that, by contract, ASK owed to the subsidiary.  Snake eyes.

ASK's failure to prove that CSUSA breached a management contract dooms any complaints ASK has about the trial court's dismissal of categories of contract damages.

ASK's non-contract claims are scuppered by the economic loss rule.

CSUSA's "advances" to ASK were nothing more than loans.  Loans by a charter school management company to a school are prohibited by Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.124(a) (Vernon 2006).  CSUSA got a judgment for them at the trial level.  That judgment is tossed by the Tyler court.

Neither side gets anything. 

Bus. Corp. Act case decided by the Bus. Orgs. Code?!?

Sembera v. PetroFac (Published): Tyler’s PetroFac, in its S-Corp form, vanished when its shares were exchanged for shares in a new “Limited” PetroFac corporation. An S-Corp shareholder dissented to this exchange. Under the Business Corporations Act, a dissenter has the right “restoration” of his shares -- so long as it is “without prejudice to any corporate proceedings which may have been taken during the interim.” The Tyler court uses the soon-to-go-into-effect Business Organizations Code to determine that the share exchange is a prejudiced proceeding under the Act. Bottom line: A dissenting shareholder can’t get “restoration” of shares in a corporation that no longer exists.

But it's a long road to get to that conclusion ...

Continue Reading...

A teachable moment.

Ott v. Dimond (Published): Contract for 25 years of employment ruled unenforceable for lack of consideration. Father/president of family-owned car dealership fires his son and asks the sales manager to run the dealership – giving the manager a 25-year employment contract. After the father’s death, the son becomes president and fires the manager.  Manager sued to enforce the contract.  He lost.

This case is a great lesson in how the world really works. For reasons I’ll get into later, let me say up front that I don’t know any of the parties, much less their states of mind.

The Dimond [not a typo] family owns the “Jack ‘O Diamonds” dealerships in Tyler and Longview. Jack Dimond, the father, was the president of the business as of early 2004. Jack had concerns about how his son, John, was handling things. Jack fired John from John's VP position. Jack then asked the sales manager at the Longview dealership, Bill Ott, to be in charge of all operations at that facility. As part of that request, Jack gave Bill a document (signed by Jack) promising Bill 25 years of employment with Jack ‘O Diamonds.

Jack passed away that same year. John (and family members aligned with him) inherited a controlling interest in the business. Those shareholders elected John to succeed his father as president. One of John’s first acts as president was … firing Bill. Bill sued, claiming breach of the 25-year employment contract.

But the document Bill relied on wasn’t a contract at all. Legal resolution of the case was straightforward. Contracts have to be based on consideration, and there wasn’t any. Sure, on the face of the contract it probably looked like a “deal” to a layman – Jack promised that Bill would have a job for 25 years, and in return, Bill promised to work for 25 years. But Jack’s promise doesn’t count in the eyes of the law, and neither does Bill’s.

First, Jack’s promise: the 25 years of employment wasn’t an absolute guarantee. Instead, it was merely a proposal that Bill would not be fired except for “good cause.” What does “good cause” mean? It’s not spelled out. Therefore, it means what the dealership says it means, and doesn’t really change the fact that Bill is an “at will” employee. In short, Jack’s promise means nothing, and is not valid consideration for a contract. See, Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998).

Likewise Bill’s promise meant nothing at law. The same document that indicated Bill promised to work for Jack ‘O Diamonds for 25 years also stated that, promise notwithstanding, Bill retained the right to quit at any time. Again, that’s no consideration for a contract. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. 2003).

What was really going on here? I don’t know. Start with the principles of “A man’s word is his bond” and “business is business” and kick this scenario around a little. Take the names out of it because it’s just not right to attach speculation to real people.

Having done that , make assumptions. Assume that the father had his wits about him. Then assume that he didn’t. Assume that the sales manager was just a good guy doing his job who got this dropped in his lap. Then assume that he weaseled his way into the father’s graces. Assume that the son is an incompetent businessman. The assume that he’s not. Or assume that you’re one of these three, and you can’t know for sure about the capacities and intent of the other two. Ask your kid to step into the shoes of each of these players. What questions come to mind? What would they do? Should the son have honored his father’s promise? Was it really the father’s promise, or the promise of the company itself made by and through its then-president? Was it the father’s place to make a promise that would extend beyond his own life? What should the sales manager have done when presented with the promise? (Well, for one thing, he should have consulted a good employment contract lawyer.) But beyond that, what are the practical ramifications of getting the blessings of your present boss, and thereby getting the enmity of your future boss? Was the father cagey enough to know that the promise could never be enforced – was the manager being used as part of a ploy to toughen up the son? Or was the father’s promise genuine?

A discussion like this is bound to tell you a lot about your kid’s readiness for the challenges of adulthood, and tell them a lot about your approach to business ethics.

Update: On April 9, 2008, Ott asked the Texas Supreme Court to extend his time to file a petition for review.  On April 10th, the request was granted, and Ott was given until April 28th.  That's the last notation in the file.  As of June 11, there's no indication that Ott ever filed a petition for review.

Pushing the jurisdictional envelope.

Triple SSS Aviation v. Adkison (Published Memo):  Adkison, a Rusk County lawyer, sued in Rusk County to collect the escrow when a deal to sell his 1981 Cessna fell through. 

The buyer was a Delware company headquartered in Michigan who when through a broker in Missouri and an aircraft title company in Oklahoma.  The buyer was not authorized to do business in Texas, had never done business in Texas, had no office, mailbox, or employees in Texas, didn't manufacture a product that could enter the stream of commerce in Texas, didn't advertise in Texas, had no clientele in Texas, had never solicited business in Texas, and didn't maintain an internet website that could be viewed by a Texas resident. 

There was a written agreement concerning the sale of the airplane.  The agreement called for a $50,000 escrow.  It also provided that agreement would be construed under the laws of the State of Michigan.  While the choice-of-law clause isn't controlling, it does tip the scales towards it being unfair to drag Triple SSS to Texas.

Apparently, the only contacts with Texas were a couple of phone calls between Adkison and the officers of the buyer.  That being said, there were no face-to-face meetings, and the bulk of the negotiations were conducted through the Missouri broker.

When test pilots push their planes beyond the performance envelope, they crash and burn.  Adkison's argument based on the phone call exceed the jurisdictional envelope, with similar results.  But, like Chuck Yeager at the end of The Right Stuff, I imagine he's OK.