East Texas Appeals Lawyer & Attorney : Jeff Rambin Law Firm : Civil and Criminal Appeals : 12th Court of Appeals, Tyler, Texas

A while back, I posted on a Batson case in the criminal context.  Today, the Supreme Court of Texas handed down a Batson decision in the civil context -- a case of alleged racial discrimination in the workplace.

Today, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the employer's attorney struck two potential jurors on account of their race.  Wow.  The jury that was seated didn't buy the employee's claims of racial discrimination.  They entered a verdict for the employer.  Today, though, the Supreme Court of Texas set aside that verdict, and sent the case back for a new trial.  The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Jefferson.

The last time the Supreme Court of Texas looked at Batson issues was more than ten years ago. since then the Supreme Court of the United States of America has examined the issue.  See the NY Times article on the case here.

Batson is a three step process.  First, there's a charge that a potential juror was excluded on account of race.  Second comes an assertion of race neutral reason for the exclusion.  Third is an examination of whether that race neutral reason is merely a hollow pretext.  With today's decision, step three just got a whole lot more interesting, and important.

The concurring opinion says that Batson isn't enough.  In their view, Batson is only a partial remedy for the abuses that come from giving parties the ability to exclude potential jurors. The full remedy? Do away with preemptory challenges.

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In this week's orders, the Supreme Court of Texas granted review on Kappus. 

Kappus is an estate case where an ex-wife got her ex-brother in-law disqualified as executor of her ex-husband's estate.  James and John owned some land together.  James died.  John was named his executor.  James was also survived by children and an ex-wife, Sandra.  Ever since the divorce, Sandra's relationship with John has been sour.  Now Sandra has some questions about the land.  Over the years James, John and Sandra had made improvements on the property.  That makes it more complicated to figure out what the land is worth, and how the proceeds of any sale should be divided.  John is representing the estate while at the same time pressing to reduce the estate's share in the land (and increase his own.)  Sandra claims this is a conflict of interest for John.  The Tyler court agreed.  Now the Supreme Court is going to hear oral argument in December.

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The Supreme Court of Texas did not issue any opinions this week.  There were no Tyler cases in their orders.  So, as discussed in the Last Word post, there remains only one Tyler case that the Supreme Court of Texas has agreed to hear.  As before, there are 10 other cases from Tyler in various stages of asking to be heard.

September 17th was Constitution Day.  To commemorate the occasion, Justice Willett of the Supreme Court of Texas authored this piece in the Austin American Statesman.  Justice Willett is rightfully proud of his work on the Constitutional Sources Project, an effort to create an authoritative online archive of the documents giving background and context to the United States Constitution.  It's really amazing.  Not only can you read the Constitution online, but, for each clause, you can click on a link that will take you to sources discussing the clause -- sources like the Federalist Papers, James Madison's Notes of the Constitutional Convention, ratification debates in the state legislatures, etc, etc.  Thanks to Don Cruse for pointing this out.

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Not long ago, the Tyler court threw out a case by a high school football coach who felt like he had been defamed in a rival town's newspaper.  The coach asked the Supreme Court of Texas to review the Tyler court's decision.  Today, the coach got his answer: No.  Game Over.

Please take a look at my prior Friday Night Lights post for the details.  Check out the show's website here.

Also, check out the website of the Supreme Court of Texas for information on court closures related to Hurricane Ike, and scroll below for information about how courts in Texas may respond to prolonged closures (you can't miss the post, it's the one with the radar clip of Hurricane Rita). 

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This past Friday the Supreme Court of Texas issued a grand total of zero opinions.  They were entitled to a rest.  They'd issued a boatload the week before.  There were a few cases dismissed in the weekly orders.  A few new cases were filed, too.  But nothing from Tyler.

The State Bar of Texas has a very good list of law blogs, with "Featured Posts" on a sidebar.  If you haven't checked it out, it's worth a look.  If you're here because this post got featured, my apologies.  Don't get me wrong, I appreciate the link from the State Bar's site.  But this particular post is boring.  Please check the "Supreme Court of Texas" category on the right to see some spicier versions of the weekly update.

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I checked out the Interim Report of the Task Force to Ensure Judicial Readiness in Times of Emergency.  Basically, it calls for counties to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Supreme Court of Texas.  If you sign up, you promise to provide facilities for nearby counties when they're out of commission.  In return, you'll be paid rent, and you'll have the comfort of knowing that other signatory counties will house your courts if the need arises.  But don't sign up unless you mean it.  When the time comes, the decision won't rest in the hands of your county officials.  Instead, a judicial authority will come knocking with the MOU in hand saying: "We're here!"

Here's a key part of the thirteen page report:

In the event that the Supreme Court or the presiding judge of the _________ Administrative Judicial Region designate in writing that the assistance of __________ County is required to ensure the continued operation of the courts in a designated county, or assistance is requested by any Local Administrative Judge __________ County agrees to provide the following to enable the Appellate, District, Statutory, and Constitutional County Courts of designated county to continue court operations:

A. adequate facilities for court sessions;
B. adequate office space for judges and essential administrative staff, including essential county and district clerk staff; and
C. adequate telecommunication and information management tools necessary for the judges and essential administrative staff to conduct court business.

_________________ County agrees to provide assistance within 24 hours of notice of a designated county requiring its assistance.___________ County agrees to provide assistance under this MOU without any further contractual requirements for a period of up to seven working days. If it is anticipated that assistance will be required beyond seven working days, _____________ County and designated county will negotiate an interlocal agreement for the additional support.

The plan sounds reasonable enough.  But here in Smith County, the debate is over whether we have enough room for our own courts.  If the judges, clerks and bailiffs from some other county came knocking, I don't know where we'd put them.  I sure would like to know how many counties have signed up for this plan.

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Gustav, thankfully, wasn't as bad as feared.  He was plenty bad enough, especially in Louisiana and Mississippi.  Texas has been spared the brunt.  Still, I'm very glad to say that my wife's grandparents got out of Beaumont and came up here to Tyler.  Being prepared is the sensible thing.

On the subject of preparedness, today seems like a good day to post on the Task Force to Ensure Judicial Readiness in Times of Emergency.  It was formed in November 2007.  The name accurately tells you what the committee is about.  But the name is bureaucratic and, well, lifeless.  Don't let that fool you.  Chief Justice Jefferson put the work of the Task Force in very human terms in his opening comments at a May, 2008 meeting:

And first, let me start with just an apology. It seems to me I should have been thinking about this from the very beginning. We all should anticipate, be thinking about anticipating emergency situations. But it came most clear to me when I was watching what transpired after Hurricane Katrina and the devastation that New Orleans suffered as a result of it.

And looking at the families on TV standing on rooftops and floating in the lakes that were caused by the levees breaking.

And I wondered, at that time, what are the children going to do? Some of them have lost their parents. How are they going to find them? And you need a judicial system to introduce them into, if necessary, foster care on the road to permanent adoption if their parents are lost.

What happens to those who are involved in the criminal justice system? There were no courthouses open. There were no judges to take arraignments. That has an impact on the safety of the community.

And it seemed to me that judges ought to have a plan in place to take care of that sort of contingency.

And then right after Hurricane Katrina came Hurricane Rita. And we saw the impact of Rita and we saw the impact of Rita on Texas and the devastation it caused. There were so many lawyers that called us after Hurricane Rita hit saying, “What do we do? The courthouse is closed and there is a statutory deadline coming up. How do we protect our client’s interests?”

And so at that point we convened an Emergency Task Force of our Rules Advisory Committee to look at modifying the rules to accommodate that situation.

All of this led me to think the judiciary needs to work and needs to be prepared for not only natural disasters like the hurricanes I mentioned but terrorism. A health pandemic. With the goal that the rule of law is maintained. After all, judges here, members of the armed forces, we swore an oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States.

And to do that, we have to have access to justice for our citizens, especially our most vulnerable citizens. And so in the end this is not about courthouses, it is not about judges. It is not even about court personnel. It is about the citizens of the State of Texas and doing our best to ensure that their civil rights are protected.

The work of the Task Force is ongoing.

Update: on a related note, Todd Smith at TexasAppellateLawBlog has posted on the Gustav-related closure of the Fifth Circuit until next week.

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On July 25th, the Supreme Court of Texas issued five identical decisions indicating that it would hold off on deciding the constitutionality of a provision of the Family Code dealing with appeals from terminations of parental rights.  That's probably a hint to the Texas Legislature to address the issue in the next session.  All well and good.  But what should trial judges do while waiting for a new statute?

Well, two of today's twenty-two decisions from the Texas Supreme Court deal with appeals from terminations of parental rights.  One case, In the interest of G.B., et al., reiterates the high court's position that it will hold off on deciding the constitutional issues.  The other, In the interest of M.N., a child, offers some help for trial judges in these in-between times.

Under the Family Code, terminated parents have fifteen days to file their statement of appellate issues.  But is that fifteen days a hard-and-fast deadline, or may a trial court grant extensions?  Today, the Supreme Court of Texas said that trial courts have the authority to extend the fifteen day deadline.

But there was a lone dissent.  Rather than butcher Justice Willett's brief words, here they are

For better or for worse, the Legislature in Family Code section 263.405(b) set a firm fifteen-day deadline for filing a statement of points for appeal. Reasonable people can dispute the efficacy of this hard-and-fast deadline, but few can dispute its clarity.

I fully understand the Court’s desire for leniency in enlarging the fifteen-day deadline beyond the statute’s terms. Appealing the termination of one’s parental rights is serious business, and having such rights vanish because of a counsel’s (or pro se litigant’s) mis-calendaring is nigh unfathomable. On the other hand, every day of childhood is irreplaceable, and society benefits when children are placed in safe, secure and loving homes as quickly as possible.

The Legislature wanted these cases to proceed with alacrity, reducing post-judgment delay by barring appellate consideration of tardy points. I would take lawmakers at their word: fifteen days means fifteen days. Squeezing out delay, however, does not permit squeezing out due process. It is one task to honor a fast-tracking statute’s unambiguous text and refuse to judicially rewrite it under the guise of construction. It is quite another to examine whether that text, however plain, unconstitutionally restricts due process or other guarantees. Terminating parental rights cannot warrant terminating constitutional rights.

I would (1) hold that court-made rules of procedure do not trump the Family Code’s fifteen-day deadline and then, assuming preservation, (2) confront head-on whether this statutory deadline violates Durham’s due-process rights or any other constitutional provision.  Because the Court does neither, I respectfully dissent.

 

In a footnote, Justice Willett notes that the Supreme Court of Texas has granted review of a petition squarely presenting the constitutional questions.  I still stand by my earlier prediction that the issue won't be decided until the Legislature takes another look at this.  But I could be wrong.  The 81st Regular Session of the Texas Legislature convenes on January 13th, 2009.  If there aren't any good bills in the works on day one, Justice Willett may have an easy time of bringing other Justices over to his way of thinking.

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Twenty two decisions today out of the Supreme Court of Texas.  None in Tyler cases. There was, however, a case involving a Brookshire's employee out of the Texarkana court.  I may post on that one later.

Even though there were no decisions, there was a fair bit of action on Tyler cases.

The Collins case is set for oral argument on November 12th.

The Geiger v. Williams petition for rehearing was denied.

The Walter mandamus out of Smith County was denied (that one had bypassed the Tyler court and gone straight to Austin).

Addicks has expressed an intent to file a petition for review of the Tyler court's decision in his prisoner's civil rights case.

Sembera's petition for review has been filed in the PetroFac case.

And though it's not a Tyler case per se, it's definitely worth noting that the Entergy case is set for oral argument on October 16th.  The outcome of Entergy could impact Tyler's Petrofac and City of Athens v. MacAvoy cases.

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This week the Supreme Court of Texas took action on a couple of Tyler cases.  The SCoTX had previously declined to hear hear the Willich case.  Then there was a motion for rehearing asking the SCoTX to reconsider.  This week, the SCoTX declined the case again, denying the motion for rehearing.

In addition the SCoTX denied temporary relief in the Tieri case, so the decision of the Tyler court stands while the SCoTX decides whether or not to hear the case.

If you practice in East Texas and haven't checked out the Last Word post from a week ago, please do.  The cases have changed (Willich is off the docket, Tieri is now on it).  But the numbers are still the same.

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City of Athens v. MacAvoy (Published): An Athens PD officer was sleeping on the job -- with a married woman.  The husband finds out, and files a complaint with the Chief of Police  This sets off a jurisdictional "Who's on First?" of police officer discipline.

The Chief placed the officer on indefinite suspension.  Texas Local Government Code Chapter 143 gives officers a right to appeal discipline actions to an independent examiner.  The officer appeals.  He says the suspension was improper because, under Texas Government Code Chapter 614, he should have been given a copy of the husband's complaint before he was suspended.  The 143 examiner agrees with the officer, and reverses the suspension.

The City of Athens appeals the examiner's decision by suing.  The City contends that the 143 examiner didn't have jurisdiction to apply 614.  The trial court held that it (the trial court) did not have jurisdiction because Chapter 143 makes the examiner's decision final, unless the examiner lacked jurisdiction.

The Tyler court says: 

1. Look into the City's allegations.  Maybe 614 is beyond a 143 examiner's authority to apply, maybe it isn't.  Either way, the City's pleadings raise the question.  The trial court jumped the gun by dismissing the case.  For now, the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the question.  After considering the matter, it may turn out that the The City is wrong, in which case the trial court will not have jurisdiction.  But the City may be right, in which case the trial court will have jurisdiction.  Case remanded so the trial court can figure it out.

2. Don't get sucked into another jurisidctional merry-go-round.  Let's say that the 143 examiner does have authority to apply 164. There are occasions when an examiner's application of a statute is so hare-brained that the application is outside of the examiner's authority.  "Don't go there", says the Tyler court (not in so many words, of course).  The City complains that, even if 614 applies, the Chief himself qualifies as a "complainant" and thus the officer was given the required pre-suspension complaint.  The examiner figured that the complaint that 614 is about is the husband's.  That's not exactly a hare-brained conclusion.  It may still be wrong, of course.  If the Tyler court were deciding the issue itself, it might side with the City.  But the point is that Chapter 143 gives examiners a wide degree of latitude in interpreting statutes within their jurisidiction to apply.  This interpretation is within that latitude.

So it come back to: Is the application of a provision in Chapter 614 within the jurisdiction of a Chapter 143 examiner?  On this front, as if getting into the middle of a marriage isn't bad enough, the officer has stepped into the middle of a feud between the Texas Legislature and the Supreme Court of Texas.

The City argues that the old version of 614 is limited to certain kinds of officers, and doesn't apply to this officer.  The officer counters, "So what?"  There's a new version of the statute and a slight change in the wording makes it look like he's now protected by 614.  The City responds: Yes, but when the Texas Legislature passed the new statute, they did not intend for the new statute to change the law spelled out by the old one.

And that, dear readers, is the fued discussed in the post entitled Texas Legislature/Supreme Court of Texas Showdown!

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Odds are extremely high that the last word on your case will come from the Cotton Belt Building.  If you are thinking that you can always take your case to Austin if you don't like the result in Tyler, it's time for a reality check.  You certainly can take your case to the Supreme Court of Texas, but as a court that gets to pick and choose what they hear, they may not choose you.  What prompted me to say this?  The Supreme Court of Texas took action on 19 cases in today's orders.  None of them were from Tyler. 

But it's about more than one week.  Let's put some numbers on it:

Out of all the 525 cases currently pending before the Supreme Court of Texas, only 11 are from Tyler.  Bear in mind that the SCoTX has not decided to hear all 11 of those cases.  In fact 10 of them are in various stages of asking to be heard by the SCoTX.  There is only one Tyler case -- one --- that the SCoTX has said it will hear and decide.

Here is a chart I've pulled from a project that Don Cruse at SCOTXblog has in the works. The project is under wraps right now, but from my sneak peek, I can already tell you I’ll have good things to say about it when he releases it to the public.  These numbers are based on petitions on the active docket of the SCoTX.  The total cases are in parentheses next to the court of appeals name. 

For a more detailed analysis, the plain language breakdown of the colors is: gray = something's been filed, but no initial briefs yet.    green = initial briefs filed begging the SCoTX to hear the case.     yellow = the SCoTX wants more briefing, but hasn't taken the case.     orange = the SCoTX has taken the case but hasn't heard oral argument yet.     red = the SCoTX has taken the case, all the briefing and arguing is done, and everyone's biting their nails waiting for a decision.     purple = more begging, this time for a do-over after the SCoTX has either declined the case or issued a ruling someone doesn't like.

Think of all the resources you'd consider using in your case "if it came to that."  If you've got a case going before the Tyler court, you've reached "that" point.

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No Tyler cases in today's orders before the Supreme Court of Texas.  So, just for fun, here's a great quote from a Blawgletter post on a 7th Circuit banking scam case in which the court made plain its disdain for scammers who tried a defense that they couldn't be guilty because they themselves have been scammed by their ringleader (who was not a party to the case, and who had taken the lion's share, but not all, of the loot):

One is reminded of the highwayman's case. Everet v. Williams (Ex. 1725), belatedly reported in Note, "The Highwayman's Case," 9 L.Q. Rev. 197 (1893) . . . . One highwayman sued another, claiming that he was entitled to a larger share of the loot from a series of joint robberies. The suit was dismissed, both were hanged, and the plaintiff's lawyers were fined for having brought a suit "both scandalous and impertinent."

The case, SEC v. Lyttle, serves as a good jumping-off point for research on two principles: 1. Guilt can be inferred when someone takes the Fifth in a civil case, 2. Even a person's state of mind can be established as a matter of law and resolved via summary judgment (for non lawyers, that means the proof can be so clear that the case doesn't need to take up a jury's time).

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No Tyler cases in today's Orders.  For that matter, no published opinions from the Supreme Court of Texas.  The dog days of summmer are upon us.

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There are five opinions from the Supreme Court of Texas this morning.  One (In re S.K.A., et al) is from Tyler.  They're all one line per curiam opinions.  Here's the full text:

The petition for review is denied. In denying the petition, we neither approve nor disapprove the holding of the court of appeals regarding the constitutionality of Texas Family Code section 263.405(i).

I've posted before about this section of the Family Code.  Parents whose rights have been terminated for child abuse or neglect must do more than what is usually required to file an appeal.   They must file a statement of their grounds for appeal within fifteen days after the trial judge signs the order terminating their parental rights.

The cases denied today challenged the constitutionality of that requirement.

The case I posted about earlier challenged the constitutionality of that requirement as it applies to indigent parents, who can't get a free record of the proceeding before the trial court until after the fifteen days has already expired.  The earlier post gives more extensive background into this field.  So now that I've set it up, here is the link.

What do today's cases mean?  I take them as a shot across the bow to the Texas Legislature.  And it's not a subtle one.  I mean, really, five opinions, all the same, they're the only ones this week, with "we neither approve or disapprove" language that would have been inherent from a plain, one-word denial (which for non-lawyer readers would mean that the Supreme Court "is not satisfied that the opinion of the court of appeals has correctly declared the law in all respects, but determines that [the case] presents no error that requires reversal or that is of such importance to the jurisprudence of the state as to require reversal ....).  

For a while there, it looked like the FLDS cases were going to bring this issue to a head in a very visible way, perhaps forcing the Supreme Court of Texas to decide the issue.  While the heat has been turned down on the FLDS pressure cooker, the Supreme Court has made it clear that they've got some questions about the Family Code, and would prefer that the Texas Legislature handle the matter.

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The only case on July 17th's Supreme Court  of Texas Order List is a denial of mandamus that leaves open some questions on a trial court's ability to grant "partial" new trials.  It's In re Mary Jane Barton, a case out of the 7th Court of Appeals in Amarillo.  But there's an East Texas connection. 

A couple got divorced in Potter County, Texas (Amarillo).  Apparently, that's where they lived during their marriage.  The divorce decree made the husband and wife joint managing conservators of their child.  The wife was given the authority to pick the child's primary residence.  But that authority was limited to the counties in the Amarillo area so long as the husband lived there.

This was a problem for the wife.  While the divorce was pending, she and the child had moved to East Texas.  Specifically, Gilmer, Upshur County, Texas. (Home of the Yamboree)  The opinion doesn't say, but I'd bet that's where the wife's family is from.  In the month after the divorce decree was entered, she didn't exactly go rushing back to Amarillo to find a job and a house.  Which is to say: She stayed in Gilmer.

Before the Potter County trial court's jurisdiction expired, the husband moved for, and got, a partial new trial of the divorce on the limited issue of which parent would get to establish the primary residence of the child.  The wife objected, and eventually filed a mandamus proceeding, on grounds that the trial court couldn't reopen that issue without also reopening the issue of the geographic restrictions on that right.  The opinion doesn't say what the wife wanted to do on the geographic issue.  Maybe she wanted the husband to be pinned down to a particular Amarillo area location.  Or maybe she wanted a complete role reversal, as in: "OK, hubby, you get to pick the primary residence, but it has to be in Upshur County."

The Amarillo court notes that the wife was tardy in bringing her mandamus action.  That alone would justify their denial of her mandamus.  But the Amarillo court also reaches the merits, stating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial just on who was going to pick the child's residence without reopening any geographic limitations on where that pick could be made.

The Supreme Court of Texas, without issuing an opinion, denied the wife's attempt to reverse the Amarillo court.  So the trial court's judgment stands.

The issue of partial new trials has vexed appellate courts.  There's a Rule of Appellate Procedure on the subject, but the rule is more of a starting point than a finish line.  Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(b) provides that:

If the error affects part of, but not all, the matter in controversy and that part is separable without unfairness to the parties, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered only as to the part affected by the error. 

To me, that's basically a statement of "use your common sense."  Which isn't much help because one person's common sense is another's lunacy.  Rule 44.1(b) provides one specific example:

The court may not order a separate trial solely on unliquidated damages if liability is contested.

That's very helpful.  But if you sense the potential for a partial new trial in your case, get ready for some research and some briefing, because the rest of the examples are in the caselaw like In re Barton.

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No high court opinions on Tyler cases.  In the order list is a denial of a motion to amended a petition for review as moot.  The case is Willich, a pro se will contest where a disinherited son challenges the Tyler court's affirmation of his mother's ability to leave everything to a grandson.  Apparently, the son is fighting this case from jail.  A search for "Willich" cases in the Tyler court turned up a man by the same name whose 18 year sentence for a DWI (there were prior DWIs and a felony burglary of a habitation) was affirmed in 2005.  Willich has been fighting that one pro se on direct appeal and via habeas, with the Court of Criminal Appeals rejecting his latest effort in April of 2008.  Docket sheet here.

OK, no groundbreaking legal stuff here.  Just another example of what goes on in our courts of appeal.

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Back in March, the Supreme Court of Texas overturned the Tyler court in a med mal case, In re Jorden.  The issue was whether medical malpractice tort reform statutes trumped the rule of civil procedure permitting pre-suit depositions to investigate claims.  The Tyler court said "No."  But the high court said "Yes."   Actually, they said: "Unquestionably, requiring an expert report without much discovery makes it harder to pursue a health-care liability claim. But allowing health-care claims to be pursued before anyone knows whether something was done wrong has costs too. These competing concerns were once left to the discretion of each trial judge, but the Legislature has withdrawn that discretion after finding that the costs of unrestricted discovery was being afforded too little weight."  So no more investigatory depositions in med mal cases.

In Friday's orders, the Supreme Court granted oral argument in another med-mal case out of the Tyler court, In re Collins.  Date and time TBA.  In its 2007 decision, the Tyler court held that med-mal plaintiffs are entitled to seek protective orders narrowing the statutorily-required medical records release so as to prevent the defendant doctors and/or hospitals from having ex parte contact with the plaintiff's non-party doctors.  Doctor Collins contends in the Texas Supreme Court that the required medical records release is a full and complete waiver of the physician-patient privilege, allowing the doctor who gets sued to talk to any of the plaintiff's other doctors whenever he wants -- and there's nothing the courts can do about it.

Reading tea leaves is always dangerous, but the fact that oral argument has been granted is not an encouraging sign for the Tyler court's decision.  It's hard not to anticiapte another Jorden situation, where the Tyler court's carefully balanced judicial approach is set aside on grounds that the Texas Legislature has enacted sweeping, "one size fits all" laws that take away the the judicial branch's ability to weigh these issues on a case-by-case basis. 

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In today's orders from the Texas Supreme Court there are two Tyler matters. 

First, there is Spitzer v. Berry.  Spitzer filed a petition for review of the Tyler court's decision in the Supreme Court of Texas.  Berry responded with a motion asking that the petition be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  That motion was denied today, so the petition is still pending.

Next is the "White Proviso" case -- the divorce where the attorney for the husband was facing a disqualification motion because he and his client went into the marital residence to find documents the wife was hiding.  The trial court disqualified the husband's attorney.  The Tyler court reinstated him via mandamus.  The wife sought to have the Tyler court overturned via her petition for writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Texas.  Today's orders from the high court contain this notation: "The petition violates Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.6 and is struck."

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